Theater Nuclear Deterrence: Addressing U.S. Security Gaps

The security landscape of international relations is continuously evolving, with nations such as China, Russia, and North Korea enhancing their military capabilities—including non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) designed for regional conflicts. The United States’ current lack of a robust theater nuclear deterrence strategy leaves it vulnerable in a rapidly changing global arena.

Current State of Theater Nuclear Capabilities

Recent assessments indicate a significant disparity in theater-range nuclear weaponry between the U.S. and its adversaries. According to an April 2024 State Department report, Russia possesses an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 NSNWs, reflecting its longstanding focus on tactical nuclear capabilities. Conversely, the U.S. maintains fewer than 200 NSNWs, primarily stationed in Europe, and none in the Indo-Pacific region. The extent of China’s arsenal is likewise noteworthy, with reports citing approximately 500 nuclear-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and more than 2,000 shorter-range conventional ballistic missiles.

The Need for Enhancing Deterrence Capabilities

Deterring adversarial actions is fundamentally difficult without a credible theater nuclear deterrence capability. U.S. strategic forces, which comprise land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear-powered submarines, are ill-equipped to handle low-yield nuclear responses. Their deployment to address limited nuclear aggression lacks credibility, raising serious concerns about America’s ability to effectively deter such threats.

Arms control negotiations and agreements have not successfully stabilized the proliferation of theater nuclear capabilities. The Russian government has systematically violated multiple treaties, a trend underscored by experts citing a profound unwillingness from both Russia and China to engage productively in arms control discussions.

Challenges of Existing Strategic Policies

The existing strategic nuclear triad is not designed for managing low-yield theater nuclear threats, which introduces a paradox: responding to battlefield-level aggression with high-yield weapons risks escalating conflicts unnecessarily. Additionally, using strategic capabilities to address tactical nuclear use could project an image of aggression, potentially driving adversaries to closer coordination rather than deterrence.

Reevaluating U.S. Nuclear Signaling

Historically, the U.S. has effectively employed nuclear forces to communicate deterrence strategies during tense international moments. However, the current strategy lacks sufficient theater-based nuclear options, impairing Washington’s ability to convey credible signals to three distinct nuclear actors: China, Russia, and North Korea. For the U.S. nuclear signaling to remain effective in today’s multi-faceted environment, precise communication tailored to specific adversaries is essential.

The Call for Forward-Deployed NSNWs

To establish a reliable deterrent posture, the U.S. must consider reinstating forward-deployed NSNWs. During the Cold War, the provision of these weapons enabled flexible responses to regional aggressions and significant threats. Abandoning this approach has left the U.S. at a strategic disadvantage as adversaries continue to develop their capabilities, consequently undermining deterrence against regional aggression.

Strategic Recommendations for U.S. Nuclear Policy

To rectify the current deficiencies in U.S. nuclear posture, the following measures are proposed:

• Develop and deploy a broader array of low-yield, theater-range nuclear capabilities.
• Reinstate forward-deployed NSNWs to enhance deterrence in specific regions.
• Modernize strategic systems and concurrently create new theater-specific nuclear options tailored to the individual capabilities and intent of adversaries.
• Enhance communication strategies to clarify the intended targets of U.S. nuclear signaling, thus reducing misunderstandings among adversaries.

Conclusion

The current gap in theater nuclear capabilities between the United States and its adversaries is a significant concern for national security. By investing in and deploying low-yield, theater-specific nuclear options, the U.S. can bolster its deterrence strategy. Reforming nuclear posture to address the specific threats posed by China, Russia, and North Korea will enhance the credibility of U.S. deterrent capabilities while fostering stability in an increasingly complex global environment.

Ultimately, the U.S. must prioritize resources for nuclear modernization, ensuring that its arsenal remains effective and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges.

Robert Peters is a Research Fellow for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense at The Heritage Foundation.